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Case No. 16990 
NATURE OF THE KIND OF CASE, AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Appellant 1 s representation of the nature of the 
case and disposition of the case by the lower court is essen-
.ti a 11 y correct. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State seeks affirmation of the judgment; pro-
vided that this Court adopts the legal premise of the District 
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Court in finding liability on the part of the State. 
The State, however, does not abandon its claim 
that it should have been dismissed as a party to this 
action, and asks this Court to reverse the determination 
of liability on the part of the State. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While Appellant's Statement of Fact is correct, 
it perhaps should be somewhat expanded in order to more 
accurately treat problems relating to assumptions of 
risk and comparative negligence. For these reasons, the 
State will view the facts in a slightly different way. 
Kevin Yost, Ronald Sills and Steve Hammon had 
been friends for about two years, and while all three were 
min6rs, they had drunk together and had combined driving 
and drinking at times prior to the date of the accident 
(R. 181-184, 256-257). Yost had started drinking when he 
was thirteen or fourteen and drunk beer, wine and whiskey 
on prior occasions (R. 256). 
After the three young men left the high school 
parking lot, there is some conflict in testimony as to the 
time involved and sequence of purchases of beer and wine. 
It is apparent that no vendor asked Hammon for 
I.D. when he made purchases. Apparently, Hammon looked 
21 or over according to the testimony of both Sills and 
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Yost, since each of them had seen Hammon purchase beer 
and cigarettes on other occasions without being asked for 
identification (R. 181, 258). Both Sills and Yost had 
had drivers training and knew the effects of alcohol on 
drivers (R. 184, 262-263), and Yost made no objection to 
Hammon's driving and drinking (R. 263). Yost was just 
having a good time and paid no attention to how Hammon 
drove. Both Sills and Yost had driven with Hammon when 
all three were pretty drunk (R. 190). 
When the truck arrived at the liquor store, 
Hammon parked in back of the State store (R. 297). Hammon 
testified that he had drunk one beer. He went into the 
State store alone. He asked the clerk (but doesn't remember 
whether the cler~ was male or female) where the wine was, 
put down his money and the five fifths of wine, picked up 
his purchase and change and left (R. 297-298). Yost and 
Sills had waited in the truck which had been parked off to 
the right side of the door and Yost could not see into the 
store through the ~oor and did not think there were windows 
in the back of the store (R. 263). 
Yost, Hammon and Sills drove and drank after 
leaving the State store. Eventually, they arrived at Chris's. 
Sills testified that he and Hammon entered Chris's while Yost 
filled the truck with gas. At that time Sills testified he 
was getting ''fairly drunk" and Hammon was getting drunk too 
- 3-
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(R. 173, 174). All of "us" were staggering a little bit, 
and Hammon's speech was worse than it usually was (R. 174). 
Hammon bought two six-packs at Chris's from a lady who did 
not ask for any identification. 
As Appellant has stated in his brief, an accident 
later occurred in which Yost was seriously injured. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. THE STATE HAS NOT WAIVED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. 
This argument is based on the theory that Utah's 
method of control of liquor is essentially an exercise of 
its governmental power and that its "monopoly," which admit-
tedly produces income, is incidental to its exercise of 
_po 1 ice power. 
When we deal with liquor law, we find that every 
state ~as adopted methods of imposing regulations for the 
sale and service o1 liquor and methods of tapping the liquor 
trade for money for the benefit of the public fisc. Great 
variations are found in the laws of the states. Perhaps 
the two extreme positions tan be set forth simply. The 
first position is that liquor is viewed as is any other 
business, except that high license fees are imposed on whole-
sales, bottle stores, and retail outlets where liquor is sold 
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by the drink. In addition, excise taxes are imposed on 
bottle sales. The other position completely controls the 
trade by establishing a state monopoly on whole-sale and 
bottle-sale outlets. The revenues which are generated by 
licensing and taxation may then take on the form of sales 
profit. 
We might ask what is the reason for the extreme 
differences in approach? Clearly, it is not a difference 
in the ability to produce revenue stnce licenses and excise 
taxes can be made high enough to produce whatever liquor 
revenue is desired. The essential difference is that a 
state monopoly on the trade permits an easier exercise of 
the police power. 
This act shall be deemed an exercise of 
the police powers of the state for the protec-
tion of the public peace, health and morals; 
to prevent the recurrence of abuse associated 
with saloons; to.eliminate the evils of unlicensed 
and unlawful manufacture, selling and disposing of 
alcoholic beverages; and all provisions of this 
act shall be liberally construed for the attain-
ment of these purposes. Utah Code Annotated, 
Se.ction 31-1-2. (Emphasis added.) 
It should be noted that the declaration of purposes 
set out in Section 31-1-2 does not seek by this legislation 
to protect public safety. The Legislature has made a choice 
to enforce the liquor laws by criminal sanction and by re-
vocation of licenses for violations of the statutes and rules 
of the commission. For example, criminal penalties are pro-
vided for violations; and, for example, Section 32-1-32.4, 
-5-
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Utah Code Annotated, provides for revocation or suspension 
of licenses. If beer is sold to a minor, Section 32-4-17, 
Utah Code Annotated provides that in addition to any other 
penalty, the person's license to sell beer will be revoked 
or suspended for a period of not less than 30 days. Sections 
32-7-13 through 32-7-15.5 and 32-7-24 contain the general 
criminal sanctions. Even advertising by the commission, 
manufacturers and package stores is prohibited. It should 
also be noted that purchase by a minor is a Class B misde-
meanor. Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, makes it 
clear that sovereign immunity is not waived when a govern-
mental entity is engaged ·in the exercise and discharge of a 
governmental function. 
It is submitted that as a part of the exercise of 
its police power, the. State chose to make sales of liquor 
in its own stoies to prevent various transactions in liquor 
by private citizens at various stages of the liquor trade. 
In Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 605 
P.2d 1230, this Court split three to two in determining 
whether a municipality was immune from liability in the 
operation of a golf course. While vastly different views 
of legislative intent were apparently held by the members 
of this Court, it seems evident that the operation of a golf 
course by a city is a much different thing than the control 
of liquor by the State of Utah. 
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The majority opinion defines the test for 
determining governmenta 1 immunity to be 11 ••• whether 
the activity under consideration is of such a unique 
nature that it can only be performed by a government 
agency or that it is essential to the core of govern-
ment." 605 P.2d 1237, emphasis added. 
Because the Legislature has so declared, only 
the State Liquor Control Commission can sell wine. Under 
the now apparently overruled doctrine of distinguishing 
governmental activity from proprietary activity, the 
activity remains governmental because no private interests 
can legally sell liquor (excluding beer), the activity goes 
to the core of regulating the sale of liquor, and the pro-
duction of revenue is incidental since equal revenue could 
be produced from license fees and excise taxes. 
Unless the rule in Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 
can be extended to this fact situation, the State remains 
immune whatever the liability of its employee may be for 
making a sale to the minor (which sale will be discussed 
more hereafter). In Frank there can be no claim that the 
act was other than ministerial. A State Liquor Store em-
ployee is to do several things in making a sale. He is not 
to sell liquor to a minor nor to an intoxicated person. 
Other than that, he is to collect money and ring it up. 
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The first distinction in this case is that an employee 
who sells liquor to a minor is guilty of a crime. The 
imputation of a crime, or criminal liability, to a principal 
is far different than the imputation of negligent acts or 
omissions. It is respectfully submitted that the commis-
sion of a crime is not 11 ••• within the scope of his employ-
ment ... 11 within the meaning of Section 63-30-10, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. The writer is hard pressed to believe 
t h a t t h e S t a t e c a n 1 e g a 1 1 y h i r e a 11 s t a t e h i t m a n , 11 ·a 11 s ta t e 
arsonist" or a 11 state bootlegger. 11 
Whatever the liability of the salesperson may be, 
crime cannot be imputed to the sovereign on the theory of 
respondent superior. 
B. THE PLAINTIFF, THE PURCHASER AND THE. 
SELLERS OF LIQUOR ARE IN PARI DELICTO 
AND RELIEF SHOULD BE DENIED. 
A review of the record discloses that the three 
young men involved in this case deliberately set out to 
violate the criminal law by purchasing liquor and beer in 
violation of law. If any of the defendants are liable at 
all, liability arises from selling liquor or beer to minors 
who had conspired to make such purchases. The record shows 
that these minors know the effects of alcohol both by educa-
tion and experience, and had consumed alcoholic beverages 
together and had driven with Hammon while he had been drin::ing 
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on other occasions. 
The usual_ policy of the law is to deny relief 
inter se to persons in pari delicto as a matter of public 
policy. 
It might be pointed out that one justification for 
the public policy determination could be that defendants, 
in cases s~ch as this one, are required to prove negatives, 
and that the necessity to assemble proof arises long after 
the incident which underlies the cause of action. 
C. CONSUMPTION, NOT SALE, OF LIQUOR WAS 
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Utah, with some limitations, has adopted the common 
law, Section 68-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. There is no 
statute which varies the common law rule, which is that in 
the liquor-related cases, drinking liquor, not selling liquor, 
is the proximate cause of intoxication. 
Utah has not enacted a dramshop act or imposed 
statutory civil liability upon any seller of liquor for in-
juries to a third person caused by a customer, although it 
would appear obvious that the Utah Legislature has had many 
sessions in which to enact such legislation had it chosen 
so to do. 
No Utah decision exists which has imposed dramshop 
liability. 
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a. 
Several jurisdictions have judicially imposed 
liability upon persons who have served liquor to intoxi-
cated customers who subsequently caused injury to third 
persons. 
In Vesley v. Sager, 486 P.2d 151 (Calif., 1971), 
the Supreme Court of California stated that the traditional 
common law rule would deny recovery against a vendor of 
alcoholic beverages for providing drinks to a customer who 
as a result of intoxication injures a third person upon the 
ground that furnishing the alcoholic beverage is not the 
proximate cause of injury, drinking is the proximate cause. 
In this case, a tavern owner furnished large quantities of 
alcoholic beverages to the driver from about 10:00 p.m. until 
5:15 a.m. the next morning and 11 ••• knew that O'Connell was 
becoming excessively intoxicated and ... was incapable of 
exercising the same degree of volitional control over his 
consumption of intoxicants as the average reasonable person, 
and ... the only route leaving the Buckhorn Lodge was a very 
steep, winding and narrow mountain road and that O'Connell 
was going to drive down that road. Nevertheless, Sager 
continued to serve O'Connell alcoholic drinks past the normal 
closing time of 2 a.m .... 11 498 P.2d 151, 154. 
The Court pointed out that 20 states had abroga~ed 
the common law rule by statute but California had not, 
-10-
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nevertheless California had enacted legislation making it 
a misdemeanor to sell, serve or give an alcoholic beverage 
to any habitual or common drunkard or any obviously intoxi-
cated person. The purpose of this legislation was to protect 
the people of the state. The person serving liquor to an 
intoxicated person should foresee the risk of harm to others. 
The Court then overruled prior inconsistent cases. The Court 
did not rule or indicate a ruling as to whether liability 
would be similarly imposed on a social host who served liquor 
to a guest. 
In· 1976, the California Suprem~ Court, in Bernhard 
v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, held a Nevada tavern liable which 
had se~ved liquor to intoxicated customers who drove back to 
California and had an auto-motorcycle accident in which plain-
tiff was injured. ·The conflicts of law question was resolved 
in favor of the forum state even though Nevada does not impose 
liabiiity under a dramshop theory beca~se Harrah's advertises 
for California customers, it is foreseeable that intoxicated 
customers would drive.on California roads, and it is illegal 
to sell an alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person in 
Nevada. Thus, the law of the state which should be applied 
is that of the st~te whose interest in the public policy ex-
pressed in the law would be more significantly impaired. 
In Campbell v. Carpenter, 566 P.2d 893 (1977), the 
Oregon Supreme court, in a case in which a bartender continued 
-11-
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to serve beer to a customer after she was visibly intoxi-
cated and had reason to know that after becoming intoxicated 
she would probably drive away in her automobile, held the 
tavern owner liable for plaintiff's damages. This was the 
first Oregon case departing from the common law rule, and 
the reasoning was essentially the same as the California 
decisions, that the tavern owner's negligence is in failing 
or refusing to foresee an unreasonable risk of harm to others. 
b. 
Other states have had the opportunity to adopt a 
''common 1 aw" rule of dramshop 1iabi1 i ty but have refused so 
to do. Some, if not most of the courts that have refused to 
adopt the California-Oregon theory, have done so on the basis 
that the courts have no proper function in changing the common 
law, and if a new liability is to be created, this is for the 
Legislature to determine. Many of the cases also hold that 
statutes or ordinances declaring it illegal to serve intoxi-
cated people are to regulate business, not to protect the 
general public. The cases also follow the common law ratio-
nale of proximate causation. A comparison has been made that 
it is illegal to drive while under the influence of alcohol 
and that this is the statute designed to protect the public 
from the drunk. A few illustrative cases are set out as 
examples. 
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In a -1971 Wyoming case similar to the facts 
alleged here, Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396, plaintiff, a 
minor, sought recovery from the owner of a bar on the 
theory that the bartender had sold liquor to another minor 
who had become intoxicated and drove his car into a school 
building doing injury to the plaintiff who was a minor. 
It is illegal to sell liquor to a minor, and the employee's 
negligence was presumed. Nevertheless, the Court stated 
the absence of common law liability, referred to the dram-
shop statutes in some jurisdictions, and held that whether 
there should be a change of the common law rule was up to 
the Legislature. 
In Thompson v. Bryson, 505 P.2d 572 (1973), the 
Arizona Supreme Court held that sale of an alcoholic beverage 
to an intoxicated person does not in and of itself create a 
civil liability on the dispenser for injuries sustained at 
·the hands of the customer by a third person. In this case, 
the defendants had served liquor to a customer, Whitmore, 
previously unknown to them. Whitmore and another customer, 
Thompson, had been in an argument, and Thompson had slapped 
Whitmore. One of the owners broke up the altercation, the 
customers shook hands and continued to drink. Whitmore left, 
later returned with a shotgun, and killed Thompson. Arizona 
declares it illegal to serve liquor to an intoxicated or dis-
orderly person or illow him to remain at a licensed premise. 
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It has no dramshop act or civil damage act. In Collier 
v. Stamatis, 162 P.2d 125 (1945), the Court had held that 
the purpose of the statute was to regulate business rather 
than to enlarge civil liability. The Court noted that 
California in Vesley v. Sager, supra, had reached a dif-
ferent result. The Court further held that there must be 
a duty owed to plaintiffs by defendants and that there must 
also be proximate cause, and an essential element to any 
liability is foreseeability. It held in these circumstances 
that foreseeability of Whitmore's conduct was absent, 
but assuming negligence in selling liquor to Whitmore for 
his own ingestion, proximate cause could not be established. 
In Marchindo v. Roper, 563 P.2d 1160 (1977}, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court considered a case in which the trial 
court had dismissed plaintiff's claim against a tavern owner 
who had served liquor to a woman who was allegedly known to 
defendant as a common drunk and who had a blood-alcohol 
reading of 0.35% at the time the customer ran down the plain-
tiff pedestrian. The Court of Appeals overruled Hall v. 
Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966), and thus estab-
lished a "common law dramshop" liability. The Supreme Court 
determined that the trial court was correct and held that 
the Legislature should determine whether or not there should 
be dramshop legislation, not the Court, and that the Legis-
lature had not addressed the issue either affirmatively or 
-14-
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negatively. The Court recognized that the dramshop 
liability concept has been imposed judicially in many 
states, and that an equal number of state courts had 
refused to impose liability. The Court observed, 
" ... being certain that our Legislature must be aware 
of the many problems of alcohol abuse and will deal with 
the problem presented here, we are hesitant to act at 
this time and hope that it will address this issue in 
the near future, either for or against extending tavern 
keepers' liability to third persons. We do not, however, 
feel that it would be improper for the Court to address 
this· issue in the future if the Legislature chooses not 
to act. 11 563 P.2d 1160, 1162. 
The Nevada Supreme Court in Hamm v. Carson City 
Nugget , Inc . , 4 5 0 P . 2 d 3 5 8 ( 19 6 9 ) , he 1 d that c i vi 1 1 i ab i 1 i ty 
of a tavern keeper who unlawfully sold liquor to a driver 
should be extended to a third party by a legislative act, 
if at all, and not by the Court. The Court held that the 
common law is applicable if not in conflict with constitu-
tional or statutory demands. The common law imposed no 
dramshop liability, because consumption of liquor, not sale, 
was the proximate cause of damages. The Court stated that 
the common law rule had been eroded in recent years and 
that some courts recognize a cause of action because sale 
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of liquor initiates a foreseeable chain of events for 
which the tavern owner may be held liable. The trend 
has been rejected by other courts. The choice for Nevada 
(this being a case of first impression) could be supported 
by case authority either way. It is essentially a public 
policy choice whether the Court or Legislature should 
declare the conclusion. The statute making it unlwaful 
to sell drinks to intoxicated customers is to regulate 
business since a statute imposes some limited civil lia-
bility for selling liquor to a minor, and the legislative 
intent is clear. 
It appears clear that when liability has been 
imposed on a seller of liquor, the seller has been in a 
position to control consumption. 
Since liquor cannot be consumed in a State store, 
the State employee cannot control consumption. 
D. THE SALE OF FIVE FIFTHS OF WINE IS A . 
WHOLE-SALE, NOT A RETAIL SALE. 
Even in states which have imposed dramshop liability, 
we can find no case in which liability has been imposed on a 
wholesaler. The only case we have discovered in which a "whole-
saler" was liable involved a finding that the wholesaler was 
actually engaged in retail selling under the Illinois Dramshop 
Act. In Peterson v. Jack Donelson Sales Co., 281 N.E.2d 753, 
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4 Ill. App. 3d 792 (1972), the "wholesaler 11 provided 
eight one-half barrels of beer for a union picnic in a 
truck which was set up to chill the beer and serve it. 
Eight hundred cups and ice were also provided. While 
the district Court found for the defendant, the decision 
was reversed, the appellate Court holding that the 11 whole-
s a 1 e r 11 s e t u p a d rams h o p i n fa c L 
The basic justification for dramshop statutes 
or findings of liability lay decisions is that it is fore-
seeable by the seller that the customer will become intoxi-
cated and is likely to- injure someone as a result. Liability 
has not been.imposed on wholesalers because a wholesaler can-
not foresee that a particular individual will drink to excess 
in the case of a multi-bottle sale, nor can the wholesaler 
control consumption. 
In the circumstances of this case, the clerk could 
not foresee that Hammon (the only one who came in the store) 
intended to immediately drink five (5) bottles of wine. 
There is no evidence that the clerk saw the truck or the 
other people involved. 
E. THE COURT, FOR REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY, 
SHOULD NOT CREATE NEW LIABILITY. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Courts have 
a duty to uphold the traditional separation of powers in our 
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scheme of government and should permit the Legislature 
to change the law when it perceives a social need to do 
so. 
In this case, unlike many of the cases cited 
above, the State does not compete with other bars or 
taverns for customers. It will not make any substantial 
difference to the profit of its operation if liquor is 
purchased one place or another since all alcoholic beverages, 
except beer, are sold for a State-set price. Even if liquor 
is sold in a restaurant or club, there is no mark-up.per-
mitted. 
In other States, where liquor is sold in bars or 
taverns, there may ~e a substantial profit-motive to sell 
drinks to intoxicated customers or to minors. The owner of 
a bar may be motivated by a profit-incentive to serve or 
permit his employees to serve such customers. A bartender 
might be motivated by the possibility of tips to make such 
sales even if the owner (if absent) did not want such patron-
age. Dramshop Acts, by imposing liability, tend to regulate 
the business of keeping dramshops. 
If an examination is made of cases in which dram-
shop liability is imposed (whether by statute or not), several 
factors are uniformly present. The seller has directly sold 
liquor to a person who is drinking where the seller can observe 
the consumption of liquor by the customer, and may determine 
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whether the customer is or is becoming intoxicated. 
The seller can foresee the probable consequences of the 
conduct of the person he has served, and the sale, if not 
the direct proximate cause of injury, can be foreseen as 
a substantial contributing cause of an injury to the pub-
1 i c . 
In the jurisdictions imposing liability there is 
the additional reasoning that the law exists to protect 
the public safety, as distinguished from the public peace, 
he~lth and morals, which Section 31-1-2, Utah Code Annotated 
sets as Utah's reasons for enactment of the Liquor Control 
Act. 
Utah has determined to enforce its liquor laws 
and regulations by its criminal laws. It would seem apparent 
that it could have imposed dramshop liability on itself if it 
chose sci to do. However, the method chosen by the State to 
dispense liquor is obviously inconsistent with the dramshop 
act approach. The State has no need to impose liability on 
itself to regulate its sale of liquor. It does not compete 
with any other proprietor for business and has no competitive 
profit motive. Its employees are salaried State employees 
whose income does not depend on the number of sales a clerk 
rings up, nor do such employees receive tips as do bartenders: 
waiters or. waitresses in bars or taverns. It is illegal to 
consume alcohol on the premises of a State store (as in 
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Clearfield), and the clerk has no opportunity to observe 
consumption, or know where, when or whether a customer 
will drink the liquor sold after he leaves the store. 
While the Legislature has authorized the sale 
of alcoholic beverages in restaurants and clubs, and has 
also authorized the sale of beer in restaurants, clubs, 
taverns and stores of various kinds, to some extent at 
least there may be some reasons of policy which might 
prompt the Legislature to impose some dramshop-type 
liability upon owners of such establishments since they 
compete for customers and might be in a position to 
regulate consumption. 
POINT II 
IF THE STATE IS LIABLE FOR THE INJURY 
TO YOST, THE TRIAL COURT HAS PROPERLY 
APPORTIONED RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE 
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The State does not hereby abandon its position that 
the State should not be held liable for the injuries sustained 
by Yost. 
In order to find liability on the part of the State, 
the trial Court had to find the sale of five fifths of wine 
to Hammon to be negligent. Plaintiff Yost's attorney at trial 
did not impute negligence to the State because the sale to a 
minor was a violation of law (R. 337), rather that the sale 
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was unreasonable .because Hammon did not. appear to be of 
age and I.D. was not demanded (R. 338). Assuming, arguendo, 
that the sale itself was negligent, the Court had to find 
that at least to some degree the clerk either did or should 
have foreseen the possible harm to third persons which might 
result from the sale to Hammon. It is clear that at the 
time of purchase at the State store Hammon was not intoxi-
cated, that he ent~red the store alone, and that his truck 
was parked in a position which would have ~recluded the 
clerk from observing either the truck or the people in the 
truck. The 11 foreseeability 11 of injury in these circumstances 
would largely be confined to the observation of Hammon only. 
By contrast with the situatio'n at the State store, 
the testimony is clear that two of the three minors entered 
the premises at Chris's and the other minor, Yost, was im-
mediately outside putting gasoline in the truck. The testi-
mony also shows that by this time Hammon and Sills were both 
intoxicated. Nevertheless, beer was sold to Hammon under 
circumstances in which the vendor had to observe Hammon and 
Sills and knew they were operating a vehicle since gasoline 
was also purchased. In these circumstances it is submitted 
that the condition of .Hammon at the time of the sale of beer 
and the knowledge that gasoline had been purchased made it 
far more foreseeable that further intoxication would make 
the likelihood of an accident much more probable. The Court 
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properly found this sale to be an act of gross negligence 
evidencing a total disregard for the consequences. 
There is no real question about the liability 
of Hammon who admittedly knew that he was intoxicated and 
was directly responsible for driving off the road. 
Yost knew the effects of drinking from three years 
of personal experience and from education. He willingly 
entered into the party, and evidenced no effort or desire 
to leave at any point. He knew what he was doing and assumed 
whatever risk was involved. Both Yost and Sills contributed 
money to the purchases made. 
The trial Court correctly concluded that the de-
termination of comparative negligence was essentially a 
question of fact. The Memorandum Opinion (R. 142-147) clearly 
sets out i~,its Conclusion the method by which the Court reach-
ed its decision. The Court first determined the comparative 
negligence from the point of view of causation alone (R. 143), 
then from the point of view of 11 fault, 11 meaning departure or 
deviation from expected standards alone (R. 144), and finally 
from consideration of causation and culpability together (R. 
146}. 
If this Court adopts the negligence theory which is 
the basis of the decision of the trial Court, the State has 
no reason to find fault with the apportionment of comparative 
negligence made by the Court under any of the three methods 
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of determination so candidly set out in the Memorandum 
Opinion, and frankly agrees with the balancing test 
utilized. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully submits that its Motion 
for Summary Judgment of Dismissal should have been granted 
by the trial Court for the reasons set out in Point I. 
If this Court concludes that the State is liable, 
the State believes that the decision of the District Court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of September, 
1980. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
This is to certify that two copies of the· foregoing 
Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Richard Richards, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents, 2408 Van Buren Avenue, 
Ogden, Utah 84401, and to Pete N. Vlahos of Vlahos, Perkins 
and Sharp, Attorneys for Appellant Chris L. Petersen, Legal 
Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 
l~th day of September, 1980. 
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